Re: Kay & thermodynamics

["John Kineman" <***>]

Hi Tim,

Thanks again for helpful reply. I'm not at all an expert on Kay, so I'm
speculating. It would be best to involve him, if that becomes feasible at
some point. I only mentioned him originally because when I spoke with him
he said he was familiar with Rosen and liked the ideas, but hadn't delved
too far into it. He does come from an engineering / thermodynamics
background, so it would not be unexpected to find a threshold between the
two. Probably this discussion is reflective of a much broader dichotomy in
the complexity community, where it seems to me many try to hold onto the
traditional handles. Bar-Yam, for example (New England complexity group),
is another complexiologist who, it seems to me, benefits greatly by
remaining partly (or totally) mechanistic in his treatment. I tend to go
the other way and as a result inhabit the edges of normal society. But I do
believe some communication is possible between the two.

The view that is sometimes expressed (not yours here, which have similar
caveats to mine) where systems are "either complex or mechanical," though
probably philosophically correct, seems impractical. While I agree that
complexity isn't a scalar on the one hand (philosophically), it is dawning
on me that the mixture of this oil in the holy water must still be
quantified in some way, which usually ends up being statistical or
probabalistic. In other words, while true that an ecosystem is
theoretically capable of almost anything, they do tend to behave somewhat
reasonably for some periods of time and have many stabilizing processes
that can be understood. The thresholds for rapid change can sometimes be
determined by experience, and as well the modes to which the system flips,
which is Kay's point (even if  the thermodynamic model turns out to be just
a metaphor). This leads to some concept of how long some changes might
take, and perhaps some idea of the likely range of variability which we can
learn from experience, i.e., through adaptive management. At least that is
the hope of ecosystem management, without which we might as well abandon
science-based management altogether and leave it to the politicians. Yet I
agree that the capacity for surprise is always there, regardless of what we
might think we know about probabilities, attractors, and ranges from prior
experience or theory, so I also agree with your statement that complex
systems are fundamentally unpredictable. Somehow there must be a practical
approach that teeters between these two alternatives.

The situation reminds me of the problem with quantum phenomena. On the one
hand quantum realities that "determine" behavior are fundamentally
unknowable (let's say for now, noting as-yet unsuccessful attempts to prove
otherwise), and yet on the other hand probabilities for certain specific
states may become known through experience. Is it possible there is
something analogous in ecosystems?

So, while

>"Closed systems are so degenerate that they do not provide any information
>about how the resulting open system will behave,"

perhaps it is also true that certain closed sub-systems can be arbitrarily
identified that correspond well enough to aspects of behavior we are
particularly interested in. For example, it is entirely possible to predict
growth rates of various species under given conditions. Even though they
are complex systems, they must conform to physical limits. What is emerging
in ecology now is the idea of dynamic and complex (much confusion about the
difference) organisms operating within the boundaries of a physically
limiting system. The boundaries may be more predictable than the internal
dynamics. The boundaries can conform to classical theory rather well, being
physiological limits based on physical environmental variables. While it is
true that the climate system, for example, is also quite unpredictable
(whether through complication/chaos or true complexity), we don't discuss
the species limits outside certain boundaries of space and time where the
climate regimes can be bounded. Then the unpredictability defaults to that
of how likely are the climate and other bounding scenarios, and that may
involve forecasting by analogy and prior experience, as well as factoring
in human will in making certain decisions. In this way, SOMETHING can
indeed be said, while it remains true that the entire system, taken without
any boundaries, is unpredictable.

Is that similar to saying:

>  The way in
>which the system was opened will determine much of the resulting behavior.
>[EL 184-185]

and

>  However, importantly, a complex
>system can be modeled temporarily and locally as a mechanism

???

So, then we would not discuss "how" open a system is, but in what specific
limits and for what purposes it can be considered closed??



>Well, but if organisms are Rosennean complex, then their thermodynamic
>qualities cannot be analyzed in terms of analyzing the thermodynamics
>qualities of their parts, or their sub-systems. That would be
>reductionistic, I think.


Yes, by which I assume you mean mechanistic. Just a note on this, which may
not be needed - 've noticed that the label "reductionistic" often surfaces
in the Rosen discussions as a means of rejecting an idea. I've thought
about this quite a lot and have concluded that all thinking, of any kind,
is technically "reductionistic," but what Rosen is departing from is
reduction to material and efficient causes alone. He argues to add formal
cause, certainly, and a special kind of final cause. I agree with this
fully, however the new view will also be reductionistic, just to different
fundamentals. This is basic instrumentalism, which I subscribe to
provisionally, retaining a certain belief in relative realism (that isn't
so relevant here).

To explain (probably unnecessarily) via my limited understanding, we think
in terms of symbols that are based in prior experience. Percepts are
apparently interpreted as external objects according to pre-learned (or
genetic) templates. Every concept requires component elements on which it
is based and a metaphysical world view comprised of those assumptions. All
theory is thus based on a set of prior assumptions, without which we could
not think at all. So the issue is to what are we reducing.

"Reductionism," because it refers to recent history of science, criticizes
physical/material reduction - the atomic theory. That mold was clearly
broken by quantum phenomena. And, as I understand it, since the mechanistic
paradigm is related closely with similar limitations of mathematics, this
breaking of the mold is also confirmed by Goedel's incompleteness and the
like. Statistical mechanics seems like an oxymoron to me, as statistics
don't determine any dynamics, but rather the boundaries by which we can
describe systems incompletely. Once you presume states, then you can have
dynamics, it seems to me. But in any case SM remains part of the mechanical
view, which we are rather limited to by our senses and participation in
objective (thing-oriented) existence (and thus drawn to by our interests).

Yet theory can be based on other assumptions, which is why I consider the
fundamental implications of Rosen's ideas. If they differ from mechanism,
they must embody different foundations, meaning that the ideas reduce to
different theoretical "reals" (avoiding the argument about realism for the
moment). So what are those theoretical "reals"? What is the Rosen world
view based on? I think its the modeling relation itself. But what often
gets discussed is what Rosen rejects of mechanism, which is not in itself a
foundation for any alternative. Also, if the foundation is "complexity" in
a form that leads to infinite unpredictability, that too isn't a useful
foundation for theory development. Yet in the modeling relation I can see
the possibilities for developing testable theories, something Rosen himself
apparently expressed concern about.

Anyway, my point/question is might our arguments be more effective if we
embrace rather than criticize "reduction," and then point out a different
way to reduce that is more appropriate for biology than physical reduction???


>Organisms may be analizable as
> > dissipative systems conforming to 2nd law thermo, except for their
> > evolutionary history and present day capabilities to involve "creative
> > acts."
>
>I think I disagree. As I understand it, the 2nd law applies only
>statistically and only to the closed system as a whole. If we posit the
>universe as a thermodynamically closed system (which I am highly dubious
>of), then we can say that, statistically, the universe as a whole will tend
>to dissipate toward equilibrium. This to me prescribes no specific
>conditions toward dissipation upon any given small spatial region, such as
>that occupied by an organism, or an organism within some ecosystem.

Point taken. My understanding of this is that it is generally agreed by the
physicists that local dissipation can lead to organizing processes which do
not violate the general trend. Yet aside from specific systems that do this
(dissipative systems, disturbances?), physical systems themselves follow
the 2nd law even locally. So, again, regarding ecosystems, they will
contain sub-systems that can be categorized as non-living and living, and
thus conforming and not. The total system, like the human organism, may be
considered complex because of its complex elements (although perhaps not as
yet organismic), it, like the human organism, also contains sub-systems
that behave classically. Of course our problem in exploring Rosen is to not
allow science to look exclusively at the physical sub-systems, and thus
ignore what is even more interesting about the organism -- the fact that it
is organized into a living system. But to handle this in any practical
case, I'm back to the mix of systems.


>=========
>On a broader level, one could take Kay's notion that (roughly) "tendency of
>the ecosystem toward dissipation is a driving force for self-organization
>within it" ought to be restated more generically as "tendency of the
>ecosystem toward some attractor(s) is a driving force for self organization
>within it".

Yes, I tend to agree.


>Stated this way, free of thermodynamic language, it seems
>clearer to me that Kay's proposal is deeply Newtonian: 'force' is something
>that comes from the environment and determines how the system (the organism)
>behaves.

I don't think he specifies what "determines" the attractors, but yes most
of his examples seem to be of physical environmental controls, like lake
turbidity, etc. The attractor itself, however, is comprised of organismic
behaviors, trophic relationships, etc., which are not analized; so the
non-Newtonian processes (which Kay does refer to), are probably there,
mysteriously establishing the "attractor" (which isn't a real element as
such, but a relatively stable mode of behavior). Would be interesting to
ask Kay directly.

>But complex system arise not from externally imposed dynamics but from what
>Rosen calls "gravitational" aspects within the system. It is possible to
>freeze some organisms to near absolute zero and essentially remove all
>dynamics, then thaw them and have the organism resume functioning. This, to
>me, in itself obliterates any argument for a Newtonian approach toward
>organisms.

Well, does it necessarily? After all you can stop a car and re-start it.
That could be seen as Newtonian. I would have thought the argument could go
the other way: If after freezing it cannot be restarted, then something
must have been lost besides what can be re-built through Newtonian
processes. Maybe this test isn't diagnostic either way??

Are these not simple organisms that behave this way (human "diving reflex"
etc. notwithstanding as these are at much higher temperatures)? I would
tend to consider that all process is not stopped by freezing even at
absolute zero (quantum process, for example). So it could be that with such
organisms, the living aspect may not be so entangled with its macroscopic
components that it is destroyed when they stop, or something like that. I'm
not really clear on how this argument should be made.

>And likewise, obliterates any argument for some external driving
>force toward dissipation (or any other attractor) as the basis for either
>the arising or maintenance of self-organized systems like living organisms.

Yes, I agree fully to this, although I'm unclear as to how the freezing
proves it. In any case, there are many arguments I am comfortable with that
preclude a physical process from resulting in life, if for no other reason
than the idea that you can get simplicity from complexity, but the other
way around is merely simulation.


Thanks for the dialog! Please take all I say with a grain of salt - I find
this to be a very effective way to explore my own thoughts, hopefully not
entirely at everyone else's expense.

All the best.

-jjk