Re: Function, unfractionable as first principle

["Tim Gwinn" <***>]

Hi Dan,
See interposed.
Regards,
Tim

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of Dan
> Fiscus
> Sent: Wednesday, July 09, 2003 2:08 PM
> To: ***
> Subject: Re: Function, unfractionable as first principle
>
>
> Tim Gwinn wrote:
> > Hey Dan! Good to see you on the list! :)
>
> Thanks. And thanks for running it. Also thanks for your website.
> It's very clear, informative, helpful for me, the parts I've read so far.
>
> > Can you elaborate on the how the CCP (coupled complementary processes)
> > can model very complex things like organisms?
>
> Two replies come to mind. But as prelude, remember that I don't
> see organisms as being as complex as ecosystems, and I see the
> basic unit of life as the ecosystemic combo of at least the two
> mutually causal functions of composer-decomposer. So given this
> starting point I'd say first that the main aspect of organisms that
> CCP's can help model is their integration in ecosystems in which
> they can play an essential contributory funtional role in life. That
> is CCP's help model that inseparability you described in the prior
> post - an organism is really not much on its own, it must have
> other living players as well as certain environmental conditions,
> both aspects of its context, in order to live; it's role like predator
> or prey, composer or decomposer is context dependent.


Thanks, that helps me understand it better.
This sounds somewhat along the lines of Don's alternate (M,R)-system that
explicitly includes anabolic/catabolic pathways, which are integral to the
diagram as a whole. Have you looked at that on his website?


> The second reply is that I think there are several sub-systems
> within organisms that
> may be well-modeled with a CCP approach. I mentioned earlier
> that I think metabolism and genetic processes are two major
> examples of key organismal sub-systems, sub-functions that
> seem to consist of molecular string composition coupled to
> decomposition. Think of replication - there is both the breaking
> of bonds to get a single strand, then the forming of bonds to
> build the missing complementary strand. Another example I play
> around with is what seem to me the two aspects of consciousness
> involved with internal dialog, thoughts, thinking in language. It
> seems important to me that when I think and am able to both
> generate or speak "thoughts as words" and also hear the same,
> that I have a dual aspect in my own mind. One aspect is the
> speaker, another is the listener. How else could thoughtwords
> both arise and be "heard"?


My thought is that such internal representations are a consequence of our
being creatures of modeling. We are always, I believe, innately mentally
modeling the world, and that includes modeling ourself in that world. So, I
am inclined to think that what you describe is a natural part of our inner
modeling process.


> Other possible angles would be to model an organism in an
> autocatalytic, interdependent relationship with its environment.
> At the simplest level, an organism must exist in a kind of
> mutualistic or positive feedback relation with its environment.
> Getting such a set of fully circular and reciprocal relations or
> functions, though, usually requires including at least one other
> life form (the complementary autotroph or heterotroph,
> whichever is missing). But the third element can be the
> environment itself, like perhaps an aspect of micro-climate, or
> soil organic matter, or etc. The addition of the environment
> as a functional element is important in that it makes the model
> span two levels and to have these two levels be intertwined.
>
> > My understanding is that there are
> > varying degrees of complexity in the sense that one complex
> system may be
> > unable to adequately model another different complex system. In
> LI, Rosen
> > uses the example of Number Theory, and how although it is
> complex, there are
> > certainly other complex systems which NT cannot adequately
> model. Hence, the
> > other complex system is *more complex* than NT. And of course, Judith's
> > levels of complexity demonstrates this also.
>  >
> > So, although a 3-body system may be complex, and therefore "infinitely
> > open", as Rosen would say, I would not consider an 3-body (or
> any N-body)
> > system adequately complex for modeling an organism. So I am
> having trouble
> > conceptualizing how you would put together the
> composition-decomposition or
> > heterotroph-autotroph processes in such a way as to model
> successively more
> > complex systems.
>
> Good questions and I am not sure I know anything to reply. One
> thing I wonder is how to determine when it matters if something
> is "more" complex, or merely "differently" complex? If one says
> that number theory is complex, but it can't be used to model
> an organism, does that mean an organism is more complex or
> just complex in a different way? I tend to think that showing
> differently complex is enough - evidence for no largest model,
> need for Rosen, Rosen likely more general than Newton and
> mechanisms, etc.


In the example he uses, it is essentially a case where system S1 can model
S2, but S2 cannot model S1, by virtue of S1 being richer in entailment than
S2.So, in that case S1 is "more" complex than S2 in his view. [LI 9-10] I
suppose there could also be cases where S1 and S2 have the same degree of
entailment, but are simply different in other ways, in which case I'd
imagine we could say they are "differently" complex..


>
> Another way to deal with all this is to use unfractionability as a
> first principle or litmus test of sorts. If we say that one aspect
> of an organism that we can agree on is unfractionability, or
> plan to make the focal issue, then
> we can use that principle or property as a guide to modeling and
> as a test of whether the model commutes, accords with nature.
> If the model is unfractionable - if it falls apart, ceases to
> function as a whole, loses fundamental capacity when it is cut,
> divided, or components are isolated, then we have at least
> achieved success in modeling that aspect of reality or an
> organism. This would still hit snags perhaps in terms of
> specifying boundaries or context in time, space, etc. Hmmm...
>
> An organism ceases to function if you cut out core organs or
> functional components, or cut it off from required links to
> environmental inputs. For a mammal, if you cut off the head
> or cut out the heart (sorry for bad images) or cut off the
> supply of oxygen (maybe 10 minutes), water (10 days?), or
> food (10 weeks?), it will die and thus it ceases to function,
> loses its primary capacity of life. The functions provided by
> components heart and head are entangled with the whole
> such that they are irreducible. Same is true for continued
> input streams of O2, H2O and organic C and N (some of
> which come primarily or most reliably and most quickly from
> plants versus abiotic processes).
>
> Likewise, in the models of life = open-ended evolution based
> on either/or/all of:
>
> composer, decomposer, coupling of these
> entropic, syntropic, coupling of these
> renewable energy, recycling matter, coupling of these
>
> I think if you cut out any one of the three functions, the system
> ceases to function, loses its primary capacity of open-ended
> evolution, is no longer self-sustaining, must wind down and
> revert to an abiotic system.


The thing I wonder about is whether ways of causing a system to cease
functioning is a good test for whether those ways tell us about what makes
them what they are - what makes them 'alive'. There are many ways to break a
system, but for complex systems most of them don't tell us anything useful
about the organization of the system.


> Some more ideas...I'll still do the other post on values and
> good vs bad...in a bit...
>
> Dan