Re: ontological levels

["John M" <***>]

Dear Roberto,
(the unsolicited advocate: I don't think Tim requires my help, yet
I want to reflect to an image you used): you wrote;

> Let us consider the bacterium case [...]
> I cannot imagine that you really believe that the bacterium's
> dimensions, structure and properties
> are "subjectively defined". They are not a product of our phantasy,
> imagination, or whatever.
> They are there, in themselves, and we only try to capture
>as many as possible of their properties.<

A bacterium is not a Ding an Sich, it is not "in themselves", it is in an
environment in exchange of materials I/O, what we don't include in the
sketchy image of it. And that is only a 'present tense view'. Belonging to
"the bacterium" is its generation, demise, impact of heat, light,
composition, state of its membranes for transport, chemicals I/O, etc. just
to name some, they are all cut off.
>From the 'properties' you will try to capture ONLY those which are pertinent
to it "as your model of the bacterium", from which - yes, you want to
capture 'as many as possible'.
So you made a reductionist model of the bacterium as you find fit
and study just that. You didn't 'invent' it, you 'reduced' it.

Best regards

John M
----- Original Message -----
From: "Roberto Poli" <***>
To: <***>
Sent: Monday, June 30, 2003 3:37 PM
Subject: Re: ontological levels


> Tim,
> see below a couple of short comments.
>
> (skip)
> > My concern is that any system under study, such as a "bacterium" or a
> > certain "social phenomenon", are subjectively defined.
>
> Let us consider the bacterium case (the question of "social phenomenon"
> is much more intricate)
> I cannot imagine that you really believe that the bacterium's
> dimensions, structure and properties
> are "subjectively defined". They are not a product of our phantasy,
> imagination, or whatever.
> They are there, in themselves, and we only try to capture as many as
> possible of their properties.
>
> > In Rosennean terms, a
> > system is a certain collections of observables along with the apparent
> > linkage relations between those observables. There are
> > certainly scales that
> > are appropriate and useful for studying such systems once
> > they have been
> > defined by us, but I am not sure how the identification of
> > those scales
> > suggests that those particular defined systems have any preferred
> > ontological status over some other choice of system (i.e., a different
> > defined collection of observables plus relations).
>
> The fact that we can build up different models of some system does not
> imply
> that the underlying system (the observed one) is conventional or
> subjective!
> Let me stress this point. As you know, Rosen distinguished sharply
> between
> simple systems (systems with a maximal model or systems that can be
> completely
> known) and complex systems (systems without a maximal model or systems
> that can't
> be completely known). Even if I have no textual evidence at hand, I am
> totally sure
> that he never considered complex systems as less objective (or more
> subjective) than
> simple ones (Judith, this is your turn :-) ).  Otherwise, there would
> have been no
> need for spending all those energies in providing so detailed formal and
> methodological
> analyses.