Re: ontological levels

["Tim Gwinn" <***>]

Hi Roberto,

See below.

Regards,
Tim

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of Roberto
> Poli
> Sent: Monday, June 30, 2003 1:24 AM
> To: ***
> Subject: Re: ontological levels
>
>
> Tim,
> let us  concentrate on the main point only:
>
> > > One minor aspect of the problem of levels may help clarifying the
> point.
> > > It is useful to distinguish between levels of granularity and levels
> of reality. The
> > > former depends on our choices:
> > > we may observe something at any chosen degree of detail, with any
> chosen
> > > scale. Interesting enough,
> > > most phenomena require and impose their own preferred scale(s). We
> have
> > > no choice but finding the right
> > > (spatial and or temporal) scale.
> >
> >
> > This I tend to disagree with. I am inclined to believe that the only
> > requirements and preferred scales for dealing with phenomena arise
> from
> > within our own mental capacities.What may seem a proper or preferred
> scale
> > is largely a subjective criteria: it resides as much in the
> flexibility of
> > the mind to build models as it does in the phenomena being observed.
> >
> > Our choices of circumscribing certain sets of phenomena into systems
> or
> > levels have no a priori objective basis. And, the ability for us to
> create
> > modeling relations that are congruent with those systems or levels
> seems to
> > me to indicate that we *can* divide up the world in that way (to one
> degree
> > or another), but that in itself does not provide any persuasive
> evidence
> > that such systems or levels are *the way* to divide up reality,
> regardless
> > of how proper such divisions might intuitively seem to us. This would
> not
> > mean that such levels are not useful or reflective of some properties
> of the
> > external world, but they would not have any objective preferential
> status
> > over other manners of division of the external world.
>
> There is no way of studying, say, social phenomena if the unit of your
> temporal scale is set on the millionth of the second, or if it is set on
> the order of geological eras. In order to study bacteria you need
> microns, and for studying galaxies light-years.


My concern is that any system under study, such as a "bacterium" or a
certain "social phenomenon", are subjectively defined. In Rosennean terms, a
system is a certain collections of observables along with the apparent
linkage relations between those observables. There are certainly scales that
are appropriate and useful for studying such systems once they have been
defined by us, but I am not sure how the identification of those scales
suggests that those particular defined systems have any preferred
ontological status over some other choice of system (i.e., a different
defined collection of observables plus relations).

Again, I am not denying that one can indeed define systems and divide up the
world in a certain way (science rests on our ability to do so), but I do not
see what grants certain choices of system definitions a preferred status
over others.


The specific details of
> our meters are obviously conventional (I mean, the decision to set the
> meter at that particular length). But this is immaterial. Everything is
> the same if for some reason we decide to use a different but comparable
> unit of measurement. You may consider a vector space and any of its
> bases. You may change the base, everything remaining substantially the
> same. The choice of this or that base is conventional, not the phenomena
> that are described by the space. Moreover, it shouldn't be forget that
> one of the first steps taken by Rosen was to write a book on the problem
> of measurement! I have the idea that many fans of Rosen tend to forget
> that work or, even worse, to consider it as irrelevant to his later
> development.


I agree that FM is too often overlooked. In my opinion, FM ought to be
required reading for any college student majoring in sciences, math or
engineering. I am not sure, though, how FM relates to your argument.


>
> Let me present the same point in a different fashion: (1) the world is
> not a creation of our mind (dreams or nightmares); (2) we are part and
> parcel of that same world, meaning that we contribute our own 2 cents to
> its structure. We are responsible for some of the structures of the
> world (language, businesses, technology, art and war are some of our
> contributions to the world). Many more are there, they were there before
> our entrance on the scene and will possibly be there after our
> departure. To my mind, any scientific enterprise should find its way of
> properly coordinating the two theses above. Some of the sciences are
> more interested in the so-called objective side, some in the so-called
> subjective one, some have to gove the same relevance to both sides.


The coordination of those two theses seems to me to be precisely what the
Modeling Relation provides, by providing a way to relate observations with
models in a way that congruency will be obtained. However, the paradigm of
the Modeling Relation reinforces the notion that there are no preferential
ways of defining systems.


> All the rest follows rather straightforwardly from this first point
> (well, with a grain of salt :-) )
>
> cheers, r
>
> *****************************
> Dr Roberto Poli, PhD
> Editor-in-chief of Axiomathes
> http://www.kluweronline.com/issn/1122-1151
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