Re: ontological levels

["Roberto Poli" <***>]

Tim,
let us  concentrate on the main point only:

> > One minor aspect of the problem of levels may help clarifying the
point.
> > It is useful to distinguish between levels of granularity and levels
of reality. The
> > former depends on our choices:
> > we may observe something at any chosen degree of detail, with any
chosen
> > scale. Interesting enough,
> > most phenomena require and impose their own preferred scale(s). We
have
> > no choice but finding the right
> > (spatial and or temporal) scale.
>
>
> This I tend to disagree with. I am inclined to believe that the only
> requirements and preferred scales for dealing with phenomena arise
from
> within our own mental capacities.What may seem a proper or preferred
scale
> is largely a subjective criteria: it resides as much in the
flexibility of
> the mind to build models as it does in the phenomena being observed.
>
> Our choices of circumscribing certain sets of phenomena into systems
or
> levels have no a priori objective basis. And, the ability for us to
create
> modeling relations that are congruent with those systems or levels
seems to
> me to indicate that we *can* divide up the world in that way (to one
degree
> or another), but that in itself does not provide any persuasive
evidence
> that such systems or levels are *the way* to divide up reality,
regardless
> of how proper such divisions might intuitively seem to us. This would
not
> mean that such levels are not useful or reflective of some properties
of the
> external world, but they would not have any objective preferential
status
> over other manners of division of the external world.

There is no way of studying, say, social phenomena if the unit of your
temporal scale is set on the millionth of the second, or if it is set on
the order of geological eras. In order to study bacteria you need
microns, and for studying galaxies light-years. The specific details of
our meters are obviously conventional (I mean, the decision to set the
meter at that particular length). But this is immaterial. Everything is
the same if for some reason we decide to use a different but comparable
unit of measurement. You may consider a vector space and any of its
bases. You may change the base, everything remaining substantially the
same. The choice of this or that base is conventional, not the phenomena
that are described by the space. Moreover, it shouldn't be forget that
one of the first steps taken by Rosen was to write a book on the problem
of measurement! I have the idea that many fans of Rosen tend to forget
that work or, even worse, to consider it as irrelevant to his later
development.

Let me present the same point in a different fashion: (1) the world is
not a creation of our mind (dreams or nightmares); (2) we are part and
parcel of that same world, meaning that we contribute our own 2 cents to
its structure. We are responsible for some of the structures of the
world (language, businesses, technology, art and war are some of our
contributions to the world). Many more are there, they were there before
our entrance on the scene and will possibly be there after our
departure. To my mind, any scientific enterprise should find its way of
properly coordinating the two theses above. Some of the sciences are
more interested in the so-called objective side, some in the so-called
subjective one, some have to gove the same relevance to both sides.

All the rest follows rather straightforwardly from this first point
(well, with a grain of salt :-) )

cheers, r

*****************************
Dr Roberto Poli, PhD
Editor-in-chief of Axiomathes
http://www.kluweronline.com/issn/1122-1151
Papers and other information from
http://www.mitteleuropafoundation.it
Preferred e-mail: ***