Re: Are car engines complex?

["Judith Rosen" <***>]

This is one of the issues that caused the mushroom cloud on the old list and
was the impetus for this new list to be brought into being. It was
precipitated by my posting of a preliminary list of "Levels of Rosennean
Complexity" that I had written some years ago under my father's tutelage as
part of a manuscript that I was writing, essentially "translating" my
father's theoretical ideas into plain English. On the previous list, issue
was taken with the fact that, in this set of categories, I said that there
are "simple" systems in the material world, and my father had given this
list his OK. This was in contradiction with the understanding of other list
members regarding my father's idea of complexity and the material world
(specifically the other point of view was that my father was saying that
simple systems could only exist in formalisms, not in the material world. I
am equally certain that my father did not mean that at all.)-- that's the
background for this very interesting set of thoughts by Tim. Incidentally, I
may as well re-post that list, for the members here who were not present for
the tempest it caused elsewhere.

There was one point in particular  that is a constant source of confusion
for people who are trying to understand Rosennean concepts and Tim managed
to put his finger right on it, but it needs to be really nailed down. In
Tim's discussion, he speaks of  the redefinition of a car engine (after it
is found to be a "simple system") and the fact that, when you do that, Tim's
observation that  the simplicity is lost.

The reason this happens, according to my father's work, is because if you
reduce the car engine any further than the coherent system that makes it
what it is (ie: makes it behave as a car engine) you are not dealing with
the "car engine system" anymore. You have progressed "backwards"  to other,
underlying systems that may have little to do with the original one's
behavior. This is precisely why a reductionist approach is not the best way
to study the organization of most systems in general and what he called
"complex systems" in particular. With a simple system like a car engine, you
can take it apart-- although only to a certain threshold of deconstruction--
and put it back together and have it run exactly as before. You can also
build one, from the ground up, using the "instructions" (set of models) and
have it work identically to the original.  Its organization is limited to
computable parts and computable relationships between the parts. But a
complex system (be it an atom or an organism) is not able to be taken apart
and reassembled any time you want to do so. His belief about the reasons for
this became his definition of complexity. It's not that we still don't have
the correct technology to do it "right". Rather, it is because, in his view,
there are aspects to any complex system that are entirely dependent on the
way the system is organised. These aspects only exist "in time". You can't
stop the system, (fractionate the atom, kill the organism, etc) which is
essentially taking it "out of time", and expect to "see" these aspects of
the system anymore. They collapse, the system is irretrievably deformed, and
no longer exists as what it once was. To study the detritus left over is a
waste of brain energy if what you want to learn about is why the original
system behaved the way it did.  His whole point was that these systems
cannot be investigated using the same techniques that are used to calculate
solar system movements or design a bigger bridge or build a better microwave
oven. Or a car engine. That's why he says in his work, over and over, that
to understand these systems, you have to study the organization and not the
pieces. With a car engine, you can reduce the system to its parts and
understand it, but if you reduce any further, you are no longer studying the
car engine. This is why he felt that reductionist approaches were limited in
(although not devoid of) value and frankly wrong when applied beyond their
limited scope. It is also why quantum physics is not helpful in biology--
the concept of a "state" that is essential in quantum analysis is, again,
taking the system "out of time" and this is not possible with complex
systems in my father's theoretical framework.

However, I stand by my assertion that, in my father's definition of the
universe, car engines are indeed simple systems that exist in the material
world. I never said he was right (although I tend to believe he was, and
yes, I am biased!) but I am saying that this is what he believed.

Judith
Website address: http://www.rosen-enterprises.com/
----- Original Message -----
From: "Tim Gwinn" <***>
To: <***>
Sent: Saturday, June 21, 2003 3:09 PM
Subject: [ROSEN] Are car engines complex?


> This is a post I have been intending to write for some time, but I have
been
> too busy to do so. The title of this post refers to a discussion that took
> place some time ago on the VCU list regarding Rosennean complexity and
> natural systems. The example system in question was a car engine. Whether
> such a material system is complex or not was in question. I find it
> interesting because I think the question goes to the heart of several
> fundamental notions of the Rosennean view.The following is my opinion on
the
> topic.
>
> "Natural system" is the term used by Rosen to describe a collection of
> observables and the apparent relations between those observables. Which
> observables make up the basis of a given natural system is entirely a
> subjective choice: they simply "seem to us to belong together".
>
> Obviously, the idea is that natural systems, and the observables of which
> they are composed, are taken in some basic sense to be representative of
the
> material world which we posit to exist external to ourselves. This posited
> material world is something that we know only via these observables, these
> perceptible qualities. We do not directly know the material world
in-itself.
> Rosen uses the Kantian notion of "noumena" - things-in-themselves - which
> are unknowable directly. Instead, all we have to go on are the
"phenomena":
> what we can observe. It is we who impute these phenomena back to the
> material world that we (or most of us, anyway) presume to exist
> independently and objectively.
>
> The main point is that natural systems, while composed of these
perceptible
> qualities in the external world, are still abstracted from the material
> world in (at least) three ways: 1) natural systems are *phenomena* of the
> material world, not the material world in-itself; 2) natural systems are
> *subjectively selected* sets of observables; and 3) the relations between
> observables are not directly sensed - instead we construct the relations
> mentally and then *impute* those back to the natural system (and to the
> material world that is behind the natural system).
>
> Once we have defined our natural system, we can then place that natural
> system in a Modeling Relation with some other system, such as a formal
> system (mathematical, graphical, linguistic, etc.).
>
> An unavoidable aspect of this Relation is that in order to measure
> observables (either qualitatively or quantitatively) we must *interact*
with
> the natural system. Interaction is simply the fundamental basis of
> measurement; without interaction no senses or constructed measuring
device,
> or meter, could detect anything. So it is that in science, there is
> generally a concerted effort to minimize the impact of interactions of
> meters on the system under study. Further, measurements mean there is a
> mapping of a physical interaction to some set (typically numeric) of
values.
> This mapping in itself is another kind of abstraction.
>
> Another aspect of the Modeling Relation is that the *choice* of which
> aspects of the natural system we are attempting to establish a congruence
> relationship with are subjectively selected. So it is that constructing a
> Modeling Relation is an act of art, not a rote mechanical process.
>
> In this way, natural systems are, in a sense, once more abstracted in the
> MR: in addition to the 3 points noted above, we have now additionally the
> subjective selection of those certain desired aspects of the natural
system
> with which we expect to establish congruence in the MR.
>
> Rosen defines one certain class of natural systems as "mechanisms".
> Mechanisms are those *natural systems* whose models are all entirely
> simulable (Turing-computable). Systems (formal or natural) meeting that
> criteria (all its models simulable) can also be labeled "simple systems".
>
> Suppose now, that we ask about a car engine: is it simple or complex?
Well,
> first of all, we need to be more precise: by "car engine" - to what are we
> exactly referring? This question essentially asks: what comprises the
> natural system we are inquiring about?
>
> This then forces us to make our subjective selections of 1) certain
> observables; and 2) certain apparent relations that we impute to the
system,
> and 3) certain choices of interactions with that defined system.
>
> Once we have chosen the specifics of our natural system, we then have to
> further choose which aspects of that natural system with which we wish to
> establish a congruence relationship when constructing the MR.
>
> The point is this: with the appropriate selection of observables,
relations,
> and points of congruence we can, I believe, certainly construct a MR that
> will meet the requirements of Rosen's definition of "mechanism".
Therefore,
> the natural system *that meets these conditions* will be a "simple
system".
> So, in this case, the 'car engine' will be "simple".
>
> But, in doing so, aren't we just fooling ourselves? Surely there are more
> intricate things going on in a car engine, particularly as we look at more
> detailed aspects, such as at the atomic level? Particularly examining it
in
> ways that would make that system complex (not all models simulable)?
>
> But what is required to examine these more intricate things? We must
> interact with the system in different ways, and likely in more ways. This
> means a different (or more likely, a richer) set of observables which to
> measure and to discern relations between. As well, it means increasing the
> extent of our interactions with the system (to perform the additional
> measurements), and it also means that the number of aspects of the system
> with which we intend to establish congruence are also increased.
>
> In so doing, we have, in my opinion, done several things: 1) we have, in
> effect, defined a *new* natural system by making these different choices
of
> observables and relations and interactions; and 2) we have necessarily
> constructed an *entirely different* Modeling Relation than the one in the
> car-engine-as-mechanism natural system MR.
>
> In short, we are now discussing an entirely different situation than the
> first one I posed. The words "car engine" mean two entirely different
things
> in the two cases. The commonality is that we reasonably assume that the
same
> material world underlies both defined natural systems. If we recall that
> constructing an MR is "art", then it may be more clear that these are two
> distinct and separate situations, not unlike two artists painting images
of
> the same scene using different styles and paying attention to different
> aspects of that scene. To me, this is just a consequence of the subjective
> nature of our choices of observables, relations, extent of interactions,
and
> points of congruence.
>
> Rosennean complexity is, after all, as much dependent upon the manner of
the
> observers participation as it is of the manner of the system under study.
> That is, "complexity" is not an intrinsic property of a natural system,
nor
> of the material world. The material world just "is". On the occasions when
> we interact with the material world via defined natural systems and
Modeling
> Relations such that at least one model in *that* MR is nonsimulable, then
we
> say that natural system is "complex".
>
> But what of the underlying material world? Surely if a certain natural
> system is complex, then the presumed underlying material system is complex
> too? I do not think Rosen would agree. As noted above, complexity is
defined
> as a certain result of a given MR. Since we do not directly establish an
MR
> with the material world, but rather indirectly through observables in
> defined natural systems, there is no set of models to qualify the material
> system as simple or complex.
>
> At the least, though, we can reasonably impute back to the material world
> the relations - the entailment structures - that we apprehended and
imputed
> to the natural system. In this way, we can make reasonable study of the
> nature of those causal entailment structures we presume to occur in the
> underlying material world.
>
> This finally brings me back to "mechanisms" (and, by extension, Rosennean
> "machines"). By being defined as a certain class of natural systems with
> predefined criteria, mechanisms have built-in limitations. The class of
> mechanisms can only describe those natural systems whose entailment
> structures meet the constraints of the definition of mechanism;  for
> example, such a natural system cannot possess an entailment structure that
> necessitates a nonsimulable model. The definition of mechanism is thus
> *intrinsic* - it is a definition that rests on its own internal criteria,
> not on external observation. Once again, it is not that we cannot
"discover"
> mechanisms in the world; but, rather, because the definition of mechanism
is
> intrinsic, it is incorrect to say that finding a mechanism is any kind of
> evidence for an underlying mechanistic material world with only
mechanistic
> entailment structures.
>
> Regards,
> Tim