Re: Are car engines complex?

["Tim Gwinn" <***>]

Hi John,

See interposed.

Regards,
Tim

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of John M
> Sent: Saturday, June 21, 2003 4:50 PM
> To: ***
> Subject: Re: Are car engines complex?
>
>
> Dear Tim,
>
> your esasay on Rosenean natural systems is comprehensive, maybe a bit too
> coprehensive.


I wondered if I was being a little long-winded. :)


I had trouble to remember the details over 50 lines which I
> wanted to check later on with the newly upcoming connotations. I would
> appreciate a 'chaptering' order, separate the concepts with all their
> belongings, so the logic of the description comes through clearer. It is


Yes, I tried to provide some background, some of the definitions and such,
that I felt were important, particularly because some folks have not had the
chance to read much of Rosen. However, I did not want to write too much so
that my main points would not get buried in the text.

It would be difficult to write a 'chaptered' version, I think. Mainly
because to go too much deeper I would end up just restating what Rosen said,
and it would get very lengthy.

Hmmm, some of the info is sort of chaptered on my website, particularly
'complexity', 'modeling relation' (including natural/formal systems).

If there are particular points you (or anyone else) suggest I expand on, I'd
be happy to, if I can.


> also a tool for detecting occasional points that have to be clarified
> (adjusted). Example:
>
> You emphasize 3 criteria for "natural systems": they are
> 1. phenomena of the material world, not the material world in-itself
> 2.subjectively selected *sets* of observables - and
> 3.relations between observables [that] are not directly sensed.
> *
> isn't that pointing to the personally cut-off models of reductionism?


Well, I'd say that it differs from reductionism in an important way. In
reductionism, defining the system is a valid first step in the overall
reductionist strategy of fractionating (reducing) the world into its
supposedly basic fundamental pieces.

By contrast, in the Rosennean view (and my view), defining a system is an
unavoidable practical requirement. If we do not limit our focus of study in
some way, then we end up attempting to study the universe in its undivided
entirety, which is unwieldy. It is a rueful situation: as Rosen says it "is
a basic though fateful step for science". Therefore, the notion of "system"
must always be remembered to be subjectively chosen. And as a consequence,
any study of a system is inextricably tied to how that system was initially
defined.

In a way, it is like the measurement situation: we cannot measure without
interacting with the system, but if we interact with the system we might
disturb the very thing we want to measure. It is not an ideal situation but
it is what we are faced with.


> Phenomena are our representation limited to the present status of our
> epistemic evolvement. The subjective selection is the method of
> reductionist
> topics-formulation and the reductionistic "look at it as a total unit"
> observation does not sense remote relations with other topics (maybe
> exceptionally).
> I have not have the good fortune to read the fundamental writings
> of RR with
> his later text- refinings to the initial formulations but would
> be surprised
> to see a disregard for the common sense meaning of words:  to
> call "natural"
> (as opposed to simple (simplified), mechanistic, machine) - a system which
> is an incomplete              representation of a chosen topical
> cut-off. I


Rosen uses the term "natural" only to indicate a system based in the causal
material world, as opposed to "formal" ones which indicates a system with
inferential entailments (language, math, logic, etc.). It may not be the
best choice of words, since as you note, 'natural' has other connotations;
but, since it is the wording he used, I will stick to it. Otherwise, I think
it would get even more confusing if we change his terminology.



> might use a filter for understanding his separation of the totally
> interconnected world (nature) vs the reductionistic models.


Rosen, in Life Itself, uses the term "ambience" to refer to the whole of the
external objective world of phenomena. He uses the term "material world" to
indicate (in my understanding) the material (physical) world which we posit
the phenomena of the ambience to represent.


>
> I would recommend to revise the wording, the definitions and the
> connotations in view of further consequences what accolades or adversaries
> may bring up.


I sympathize with this point. :) I wish Rosen had chosen some terms
differently - including 'complexity' - but since those are in his writings,
and his writings are essentially the reference, the dictionary, from which
we work. I would be concerned that introducing new terminology which is not
referenced in his books will only add confusion, not decrease it.


>
> With friendship
>
> John Mikes
>