Re: Are car engines complex?

["John M" <***>]

Dear Tim,

your esasay on Rosenean natural systems is comprehensive, maybe a bit too
coprehensive. I had trouble to remember the details over 50 lines which I
wanted to check later on with the newly upcoming connotations. I would
appreciate a 'chaptering' order, separate the concepts with all their
belongings, so the logic of the description comes through clearer. It is
also a tool for detecting occasional points that have to be clarified
(adjusted). Example:

You emphasize 3 criteria for "natural systems": they are
1. phenomena of the material world, not the material world in-itself
2.subjectively selected *sets* of observables - and
3.relations between observables [that] are not directly sensed.
*
isn't that pointing to the personally cut-off models of reductionism?
Phenomena are our representation limited to the present status of our
epistemic evolvement. The subjective selection is the method of reductionist
topics-formulation and the reductionistic "look at it as a total unit"
observation does not sense remote relations with other topics (maybe
exceptionally).
I have not have the good fortune to read the fundamental writings of RR with
his later text- refinings to the initial formulations but would be surprised
to see a disregard for the common sense meaning of words:  to call "natural"
(as opposed to simple (simplified), mechanistic, machine) - a system which
is an incomplete              representation of a chosen topical cut-off. I
might use a filter for understanding his separation of the totally
interconnected world (nature) vs the reductionistic models.

I would recommend to revise the wording, the definitions and the
connotations in view of further consequences what accolades or adversaries
may bring up.

With friendship

John Mikes

----- Original Message -----
From: "Tim Gwinn" <***>
To: <***>
Sent: Saturday, June 21, 2003 3:09 PM
Subject: Are car engines complex?


> This is a post I have been intending to write for some time, but I have
been
> too busy to do so. The title of this post refers to a discussion that took
> place some time ago on the VCU list regarding Rosennean complexity and
> natural systems. The example system in question was a car engine. Whether
> such a material system is complex or not was in question. I find it
> interesting because I think the question goes to the heart of several
> fundamental notions of the Rosennean view.The following is my opinion on
the
> topic.
>
> "Natural system" is the term used by Rosen to describe a collection of
> observables and the apparent relations between those observables. Which
> observables make up the basis of a given natural system is entirely a
> subjective choice: they simply "seem to us to belong together".
>
> Obviously, the idea is that natural systems, and the observables of which
> they are composed, are taken in some basic sense to be representative of
the
> material world which we posit to exist external to ourselves. This posited
> material world is something that we know only via these observables, these
> perceptible qualities. We do not directly know the material world
in-itself.
> Rosen uses the Kantian notion of "noumena" - things-in-themselves - which
> are unknowable directly. Instead, all we have to go on are the
"phenomena":
> what we can observe. It is we who impute these phenomena back to the
> material world that we (or most of us, anyway) presume to exist
> independently and objectively.
>
> The main point is that natural systems, while composed of these
perceptible
> qualities in the external world, are still abstracted from the material
> world in (at least) three ways: 1) natural systems are *phenomena* of the
> material world, not the material world in-itself; 2) natural systems are
> *subjectively selected* sets of observables; and 3) the relations between
> observables are not directly sensed - instead we construct the relations
> mentally and then *impute* those back to the natural system (and to the
> material world that is behind the natural system).
>
> Once we have defined our natural system, we can then place that natural
> system in a Modeling Relation with some other system, such as a formal
> system (mathematical, graphical, linguistic, etc.).
>
> An unavoidable aspect of this Relation is that in order to measure
> observables (either qualitatively or quantitatively) we must *interact*
with
> the natural system. Interaction is simply the fundamental basis of
> measurement; without interaction no senses or constructed measuring
device,
> or meter, could detect anything. So it is that in science, there is
> generally a concerted effort to minimize the impact of interactions of
> meters on the system under study. Further, measurements mean there is a
> mapping of a physical interaction to some set (typically numeric) of
values.
> This mapping in itself is another kind of abstraction.
>
> Another aspect of the Modeling Relation is that the *choice* of which
> aspects of the natural system we are attempting to establish a congruence
> relationship with are subjectively selected. So it is that constructing a
> Modeling Relation is an act of art, not a rote mechanical process.
>
> In this way, natural systems are, in a sense, once more abstracted in the
> MR: in addition to the 3 points noted above, we have now additionally the
> subjective selection of those certain desired aspects of the natural
system
> with which we expect to establish congruence in the MR.
>
> Rosen defines one certain class of natural systems as "mechanisms".
> Mechanisms are those *natural systems* whose models are all entirely
> simulable (Turing-computable). Systems (formal or natural) meeting that
> criteria (all its models simulable) can also be labeled "simple systems".
>
> Suppose now, that we ask about a car engine: is it simple or complex?
Well,
> first of all, we need to be more precise: by "car engine" - to what are we
> exactly referring? This question essentially asks: what comprises the
> natural system we are inquiring about?
>
> This then forces us to make our subjective selections of 1) certain
> observables; and 2) certain apparent relations that we impute to the
system,
> and 3) certain choices of interactions with that defined system.
>
> Once we have chosen the specifics of our natural system, we then have to
> further choose which aspects of that natural system with which we wish to
> establish a congruence relationship when constructing the MR.
>
> The point is this: with the appropriate selection of observables,
relations,
> and points of congruence we can, I believe, certainly construct a MR that
> will meet the requirements of Rosen's definition of "mechanism".
Therefore,
> the natural system *that meets these conditions* will be a "simple
system".
> So, in this case, the 'car engine' will be "simple".
>
> But, in doing so, aren't we just fooling ourselves? Surely there are more
> intricate things going on in a car engine, particularly as we look at more
> detailed aspects, such as at the atomic level? Particularly examining it
in
> ways that would make that system complex (not all models simulable)?
>
> But what is required to examine these more intricate things? We must
> interact with the system in different ways, and likely in more ways. This
> means a different (or more likely, a richer) set of observables which to
> measure and to discern relations between. As well, it means increasing the
> extent of our interactions with the system (to perform the additional
> measurements), and it also means that the number of aspects of the system
> with which we intend to establish congruence are also increased.
>
> In so doing, we have, in my opinion, done several things: 1) we have, in
> effect, defined a *new* natural system by making these different choices
of
> observables and relations and interactions; and 2) we have necessarily
> constructed an *entirely different* Modeling Relation than the one in the
> car-engine-as-mechanism natural system MR.
>
> In short, we are now discussing an entirely different situation than the
> first one I posed. The words "car engine" mean two entirely different
things
> in the two cases. The commonality is that we reasonably assume that the
same
> material world underlies both defined natural systems. If we recall that
> constructing an MR is "art", then it may be more clear that these are two
> distinct and separate situations, not unlike two artists painting images
of
> the same scene using different styles and paying attention to different
> aspects of that scene. To me, this is just a consequence of the subjective
> nature of our choices of observables, relations, extent of interactions,
and
> points of congruence.
>
> Rosennean complexity is, after all, as much dependent upon the manner of
the
> observers participation as it is of the manner of the system under study.
> That is, "complexity" is not an intrinsic property of a natural system,
nor
> of the material world. The material world just "is". On the occasions when
> we interact with the material world via defined natural systems and
Modeling
> Relations such that at least one model in *that* MR is nonsimulable, then
we
> say that natural system is "complex".
>
> But what of the underlying material world? Surely if a certain natural
> system is complex, then the presumed underlying material system is complex
> too? I do not think Rosen would agree. As noted above, complexity is
defined
> as a certain result of a given MR. Since we do not directly establish an
MR
> with the material world, but rather indirectly through observables in
> defined natural systems, there is no set of models to qualify the material
> system as simple or complex.
>
> At the least, though, we can reasonably impute back to the material world
> the relations - the entailment structures - that we apprehended and
imputed
> to the natural system. In this way, we can make reasonable study of the
> nature of those causal entailment structures we presume to occur in the
> underlying material world.
>
> This finally brings me back to "mechanisms" (and, by extension, Rosennean
> "machines"). By being defined as a certain class of natural systems with
> predefined criteria, mechanisms have built-in limitations. The class of
> mechanisms can only describe those natural systems whose entailment
> structures meet the constraints of the definition of mechanism;  for
> example, such a natural system cannot possess an entailment structure that
> necessitates a nonsimulable model. The definition of mechanism is thus
> *intrinsic* - it is a definition that rests on its own internal criteria,
> not on external observation. Once again, it is not that we cannot
"discover"
> mechanisms in the world; but, rather, because the definition of mechanism
is
> intrinsic, it is incorrect to say that finding a mechanism is any kind of
> evidence for an underlying mechanistic material world with only
mechanistic
> entailment structures.
>
> Regards,
> Tim